Saturday, January 25, 2025

Ministry to review National Child Policy 18 years after

Minister, Women Affairs, Inaugurates Committee to Review National Child Policy 2007 With Prof Ladan as Lead Consultant

Prof. M T Ladan as the National Consultant for the  Committee on the 2007 National CHILD POLICY/IMPLEMENTATION PLAN REVISION inaugurated on Friday, 24th January by the Hon Minister of Women Affairs, Imaan Suleiman,  at the ministry's HQ in Abuja.  Prof Ladan was also charged with the additional responsibility of producing a Draft National Child Development AGENCY Bill 2025, ALL BY NOVEMBER 2025. The Permanent Secretary of the Ministry serves,  as the Committee 's Chairperson.

Minister of Women Affairs, Imaan Sulaiman-Ibrahim, has set another milestone with the inauguration of the Committee for the Review of the National Child Policy 2007. 

This act, according to a statement signed by the Special Adviser to the Minister on Media and Publicity, Mr Jonathan Eze on Friday, marks not only a critical step in her commitment to the well-being of children, but also demonstrates her resolve to build a conducive atmosphere for Nigerian child to thrive.

The minister urged the committee led by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Women Affairs, Dr Maryam Keshinro, to adopt a holistic approach, engaging with stakeholders across all sectors—government, civil society, and, most importantly, the voices of children themselves.

She added that the policy must be inclusive, addressing the diverse needs of all children, including those from marginalised communities and those with disabilities.

The statement reads in parts: “As we gather today, It is important to acknowledge a fundamental truth: that our children are the cornerstone of our nation. 6 / 1:00

“They are not just the leaders of tomorrow; they are our greatest hope and our most precious resource. 

“It is necessary that their rights are upheld and their needs are met, nurturing and creating an environment where they can thrive and reach their full potential.

Prof Ladan with the Hon Minister IMAAN SULEIMAN-IBRAHIM (middle) 
and the permanent secretary.

“Our emphasis on this profound assignment of reviewing the National Child Policy is to reflect on the progress we have made since the inception of the Policy. 

“We have witnessed commendable advancements in sectors like education, health, and child protection, we must also recognise the challenges that persist, such as poverty, gender inequality, inadequate access to quality education, and the impacts of insecurity that threaten the futures of our children.

“It is imperative to draw your attention as members of this committee, that the task before you is both vital and challenging. 

“You are entrusted with the responsibility of reviewing a policy that will guide our nation in protecting and promoting the rights of children. 

“Hence, your expertise, insights, and commitment will be crucial in ensuring that our policy reflects the realities faced by our children today and anticipates the challenges of tomorrow.

“Therefore, I urge you to adopt a holistic approach, engaging with stakeholders across all sectors—government, civil society, and, most importantly, the voices of children themselves. 

“It is essential that our policy is inclusive, addressing the diverse needs of all children, including those from marginalised communities and those with disabilities.”

Sulaiman-Ibrahim further urged the committee to also leverage on technology and innovation in their approach. 

“As you are aware, the world is changing rapidly, there is no gain saying that our policies must adapt to ensure that our children are equipped with the skills and knowledge to thrive in a dynamic global landscape.

“It is worthy of note that this review is not just about creating documents or frameworks; it is about transforming lives. And ensuring that every child in Nigeria has access to education, healthcare, and a safe environment where they can grow and develop.

“I would like to express my appreciation to members of this committee for your demonstration by availing yourself to be members of the Committee that will make this noble cause successful. 

“Together, we have the power to make a lasting impact that will reverberate for generations to come. 

“We can only achieve this if we work diligently, passionately, and collaboratively to create a National Child Policy which is Specific, Measurable, Achievable, Relevant and Time-bound (SMART).”

Sulaiman-Ibrahim thanked President Bola Ahmed Tinubu for creating a conducive environment for her as Minister of Women Affairs to successfully strive to achieve the mandate of the ministry of women, children and vulnerable and to also operate without hindrance. 

She also appreciated the First Lady of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, Senator Oluremi Tinubu, for her support and motherly advice towards encouraging her to carry out her assignments successfully.

The Permanent Secretary thanked the minister for her leadership and assured her that the committee will work hard to ensure that an all-inclusive policy documents are produced to the advantage of all Nigerian children.

The event was also attended by directors of the ministry and the consultant, Prof. Tawfiq Muhammad Ladan, among others.

 


Wednesday, January 22, 2025

RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES NO.4, JANUARY 2025



Download Full PDF copy at: - https://tinyurl.com/yc2zkzbd


THE SDGs FRAMEWORK AS THE BLUEPRINT FOR INTEGRATING AND OPERATIONALIZING THE WATER, ENERGY AND FOOD (WEF) NEXUS: - CASE STUDY OF GOVERNANCE AND LAW INNOVATIVE INTERVENTIONS BY NIGERIA IN THE LAKE CHAD BASIN OF WEST CENTRAL AFRICA 

BY

Prof. Muhammed Tawfiq Ladan (PhD Law)

OUTLINE

—  Introduction

—  Review of the Perspectives on Governance and Law Relevant to the Water, Energy and Food Nexus

—  Understanding Nigeria in a Water-stressed Lake Chad Basin/Region of West Central Africa: - Law and Governance Challenges to WEF Nexus

—  Integrating and Operational Zing WEF Through Recent Governance and Legal Innovative Measures

—  Water Sector

—  The National Water Resources Policy and Bill

—  Organization and Manpower Review

—  Energy Sector

—  Relevant Nexus Targets Until 2030

—  Food Sector

—  The SDGS Framework

—  Conclusion






Monday, January 20, 2025

RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES NO.3, JANUARY 2025

 

Download PDF copy at: - https://tinyurl.com/mrxerktm

Bridging the Budget Financing Gaps by Unlocking Innovative Options for Infrastructure Financing

BY

Prof. Muhammed Tawfiq Ladan

Africa has no shortage of ambition when it comes to infrastructure development, and the demand for financing is substantial. African governments are grappling with formidable challenges stemming from over-leveraged balance sheets and soaring debt repayment obligations. In recent years, many countries across the continent have significantly increased borrowing to fund infrastructure projects and fulfil budgetary needs stemming from successive crises.

This surge in debt accumulation has raised debt-to-GDP ratios, in some countries surpassing internationally recognized thresholds for sustainable debt levels. This is in turn, raising the risks of debt distress, and making it harder and harder to finance much needed infrastructure spending.

Compounding the fiscal challenges, compared to other regions of the world, Africa struggles with relative low revenue mobilization, exemplified by its lower tax-to-GDP ratio. This combination of rising debt levels,  corruption in large infrastructure projects and insufficient revenue mobilization as well as volatile commodity prices related to over-dependent on raw materials exports, severally limits the fiscal space available to African governments for investment spending, particularly on critical infrastructure projects. Thus, impeding the continent’s economic growth and development prospects.

Further compounding the fiscal challenges, one important obstacle stands in the way of boosting Africa’s intra-regional trade, namely, inadequate infrastructure, which adds 30 – 40% to the cost of intra-regional trade. Just 15% of Africa’s trade is intra-regional, compared to 60% of Asian trade and 70% of European trade.

Fixing this deficit will require, according to the African Development Bank, infrastructure spending of between $130 and 180 billion dollars annually to close the continent’s infrastructure gap, estimated at between $68 and 108 billion dollars each year. in 2023, Sub-Saharan Africa invested about 3.5% of its GDP in infrastructure, which is less than 7.1% needed to meet Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 1 – 17) of the UN Agenda 2030. In 2023, in terms of infrastructure investment growth, Egypt received the highest value of private sector funds for infrastructure in Africa, with almost $2.3 billion dollars, followed by South Africa with $1.04 billion, Senegal with $316 million and Nigeria with $133 million dollars.

The above calls for a new approach to infrastructure development and innovative financing options, cultivating new sources of investment and developing more forward-thinking and integrated infrastructure plans.

The justification for the above call lies in the fact that, infrastructure (both hard and soft, including energy, transport, digital or ICT/telecommunications and social infrastructure like health, housing, water and sanitation) is the backbone of any thriving economy, and in Africa, this is about movement of goods, people and services, due to Africa’s vast size and diverse geography. Infrastructure therefore, is about connecting people and markets, facilitating trade, boosting investments, improving the quality of life of citizens and creating new employment opportunities for millions.

The call for bridging the financing gaps by unlocking innovative options/models for infrastructure financing in Africa, applies to Nigeria. With a rapidly expanding and urbanizing population, Nigeria faces a significant infrastructure deficit, estimated to reach $878 billion dollars by 2040. However, the country’s current infrastructure stock constitutes only 30% of GDP, far below the World Bank’s benchmark of 70%. Despite reforms such as the National Integrated Infrastructure infrastructures Master Plan,  Infrastructure deficits remain, with only 30% of the country’s estimated 200,000 road network, plagued by vandalism and funding gaps, is still under-developed. Despite being the cheapest means of transportation and capable of moving freight and passengers across longer distances more efficiently, rail transport constituted less than 1% of the transportation industry’s contribution to Nigeria’s GDP in 2023, which further intensifies the load on roadways.

The federal Government’s budgetary allocation of N1.32 trillion naira (or 5% of the 2024 total budget) for infrastructure is inadequate compared to the $100 billion dollars annual target set by the Master Plan. Equally, private sector investment in Nigerian infrastructure has been low too, totalling $8.4 billion dollars from 2013 to 2023, compared to South Africa’s $17.2 billion. Last week (2nd week of January 2025), federal lawmakers queried the report of the Minister of Finance on the poor 2024 budget performance which stood at 43% rate of recurrent expenditure and 25% of capital expenditure implementation rate. In the 2025 budget under consideration, infrastructure got 4.06 trillion naira out of the total capital budget of N14.8 trillion naira.

The poor 2024 budget performance report ushered in the commencement of the 2025 49.7 trillion naira or $30 billion dollars budget defence before NASS by all MDAs. It  is imperative to underscore the following facts: -

1.     Nigeria’s 2025 Capital Budget is N14.8 trillion naira, which is 16% of the total budget.

2.     Budget priorities as presented by the President on 18 December, 2024 to the NASS stood at: -

·        Defence and security: - 4.91 trn;

·        Infrastructure: - 4.06 trn;

·        Education: - 3.50 trn;

·        Health: - 2.48 trn.

3.     Budget financing at 70% equity, 28% loans, and 2% asset sales.

4.     Budget goals of 15% inflation rate and 4.06% GDP growth rate.

The poor 2024 budget implementation raised questions surrounding the issue of revenue generation by various agencies of the government. Despite exceeding their target for 2024, in a combined revenue of 36.9 trillion naira generated by the three core statutory agencies, the Nigerian Customs Service, the NNPCL and the Federal Inland Revenue Service (FIRS), the Presidential Economic Team led by the Minister of Finance, representing the Federal government insisted that borrowing was still needed for proper funding of the 2024 budget.

Nigeria has traditionally relied on public funds to finance infrastructure projects such as energy, transportation, water and health. However, progress was hampered by budget constraints and inefficiencies in project implementation. To supplement government funding, Nigeria sought financial assistance from multilateral and bilateral partners. Organizations such as the World Bank/International Monetary Fund, African Development Bank, among others, provided loans and grants for infrastructure projects. These funds bridged the financing gap and brought in technical expertise and international best practices.

To meet the over-expanding needs of citizens, new or innovative solutions/models were required, leading to the introduction of infrastructure financing models such as the Public- Private Partnerships ( PPPs), the CAPITAL MARKET and Green BONDS,  the Pension and Sovereign Wealth FUNDS and the Islamic Sukuk bonds or certificates,  amongst others,  that aimed to meet the identified needs. Out of  these models,  is the largely untapped but rapidly growing Islamic Finance .

The Islamic Finance can serve as a complementary source of funding for infrastructure development in developing economies. The Islamic finance assets has grown rapidly to about $3.96 trillion dollars in 2021 and expected to reach about 5.96 trillion dollars by 2026, according to the 2023 State of the Global Islamic Economy Report. The Islamic Finance provides a great opportunity to finance social and economic infrastructure development.

The Asset-based approach of Islamic Finance promotes using tangible or intangible assets in transactions, which makes infrastructure assets perfect items for financing by Islamic Financing methods and tools or products. Public-Private-Partnership (PPP) infrastructure and Islamic finance’s basic principles require risk sharing. This allows capital providers to participate in the underlying economic activities and contribute to social and economic development. FURTHERMORE, Islamic finance promotes socially responsible infrastructure investments which aligns with the development goals of interested economies.

Infrastructure PPP projects can be financed in a Shariah-compliant manner by applying equity financing through muda'rabah (partnership in profit), waka'lah (agency) and musha'rakah (contractual partnership); or debt-like financing through mura'bahah (sale with profit), Istisna' (build/manufacture), Ija'rah (leasing) and salam (advance purchase). In practice, the most frequently used structures in Islamic project finance are a combination of two separate structures in one transaction: - Istisnah – ija'rah (agency and leasing; and musha'rakah – ija'rah (contractual partnership and leasing). Sukuuk (Islamic bonds or certificates) is also suitable for Islamic finance-backed PPP transactions.

Nigeria has been actively issuing Sukuuk bonds to fund its infrastructure since its inaugural issuance in 2017. The Federal Government has raised a total of over N612.56 billion naira through three issuances of sukuuk, aimed at developing key national infrastructure. In 2024, the Federal Government has continued to leverage sukuk to fund essential infrastructure projects in the transportation, energy and education sectors, with the most recent issuance being a N350 billion naira sovereign sukuk issued through the FGN Roads sukuk Company1PLC.

The FGN recently proposed issuing its first dollar-denominated sukuk, valued at $500 million dollars. This proposal was approved by lawmakers as part of President Tinubu’s broader plan to borrow $2.21 billion from foreign investors to help address the country’s budget deficit. Significant portions of the funds raised have been dedicated to the rehabilitation and construction of over 25 major federal highways across the six geopolitical zones of Nigeria. Notable examples include: - Lokoja-Benin Road, Enugu-Port-Harcourt Road, Kano-Maiduguri express way in addition to Bridge construction and Rehabilitation. Moreover, the Nigerian Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) has an ambitious master plan and target to list 50 sharia-compliant products with a combined market capital of at least N5 trillion naira (USD 11 billion) by the end of 2025.

According to the State of Enterprise Report 2024, Nigeria’s Islamic finance industry grew to N2.5 trillion naira in 2023, up from N1.5 trillion naira in 2022. Islamic banking led the sector with N1.36 trillion naira in total assets, followed by Sukuk bonds at N1.09 trillion naira, while the remainder comprised Islamic (mutual) funds and takafful (insurance).

The Nigerian National Pension Commission (PenCom) equally launched the Islamic Non-Interest Fund in September 2021, to provide a sharia-compliant investment option. The fund’s assets expanded from N7.79 billion naira in September 2021 to N54.27 billion naira by the end of January 2024, marking an impressive increase of over 500%.

At the 2024 Islamic Development Bank annual meetings in Saudi Arabia, Jaiz Bank Plc and the Islamic Corporation for the Development of the Private Sector signed a $20 million dollars memorandum of understanding targeted at boosting its capital base in compliance with the Central Bank of Nigeria’s new minimum capital requirements. In 2025, similar strategic agreements are likely to emerge as Islamic financial institutions explore diverse options to meet the CBN minimum capital requirements.

The above growth and impact of Islamic finance in about a decade, shows at least, the Islamic Sukuk bonds/certificates have proven to be effective and innovative alternative to traditional infrastructure and debt financing models. Nigeria should therefore build on successful momentum by making Islamic Sukuk a core part of its infrastructure financing strategy. By expanding the scope of Sukuk use across different sectors, enhancing investor education and fostering robust regulatory framework, Nigeria can fully harness the benefits of this innovative financial instruments to address infrastructure needs, drive economic growth, boost trade, and improve the quality of life of her citizens.

 


RESEARCH WORKING PAPER SERIES NO.2, JANUARY 2025


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FROM THE UN CLIMATE CHANGE CONFERENCE OF PARTIES (COPs 26 to 29th): -REVIEW OF OUTCOMES, ACHIEVEMENTS, CHALLENGES AND THE ROAD TO COP30 IN 2025, BRAZIL

BY

Prof. Muhammed Tawfiq Ladan (PhD. Law)

INTRODUCTION

The United Nations (UN) Climate Change Conferences, also known as Conference of the Parties (COPs), are important global climate action events because they: -

     I.        Address climate change[1]: - COPs are the world’s; highest decision making body on climate change. They provide a forum for countries to: -

·         Review the implementation of the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCC), the Kyoto Protocol and the Paris Agreement on Climate Change, 2015;

·         Adopt decisions to further develop and implement these agreements;

·         Negotiate multilateral responses to climate change;

·         Set standards and advance action.

    II.        Raise awareness[2]: - COPs raise awareness of the threat of Climate Change;

  III.        Bring together stakeholders[3]: -COPs strategically bring together governments, civil society organisations, industry or businesses, and individuals to work together on climate change.

  IV.        Share benefits[4]: - COPs can help countries share benefits of climate action, such as more jobs, stronger growth, and cheaper and cleaner energy.

The UNFCC is a multilateral treaty adopted in 1992 to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations. Its over-arching objective is to prevent dangerous human- made interference on the climate system[5].

It is against this background that this paper seeks to review the outcomes, achievements and challenges of COPs 26, 27, 28 and 29 and chart the road to COP 30.

1.    COP 26, GLASGOW, UK 2021: - TOGETHER FOR OUR PLANET[6]

The UN Climate Change Conference in Glasgow (COP26) brought together 120 world leaders and over 40,000 registered participants, including 22,274 party delegates, 14.124 observers and 3.886 media representatives. For two weeks in 2021, the world was riveted on all facets of climate change — the science, the solutions, the political will to act, and clear indications of action.

The outcome of COP26 – the Glasgow Climate Pact – is the fruit of intense negotiations among almost 200 countries over the two weeks, strenuous formal and informal work over many months, and constant engagement both in-person and virtually for nearly two years.

“The approved texts are a compromise,” said UN Secretary-General António Guterres. “They reflect the interests, the conditions, the contradictions and the state of political will in the world today. They take important steps, but unfortunately the collective political will was not enough to overcome some deep contradictions.”

Cuts in global greenhouse gas emissions are still far from where they need to be to preserve a livable climate, and support for the most vulnerable countries affected by the impacts of climate change is still falling far short. But COP26 did produce new “building blocks” to advance implementation of the Paris Agreement through actions that can get the world on a more sustainable, low-carbon pathway forward.

What was agreed?

Recognizing the emergency

Countries reaffirmed the Paris Agreement goal of limiting the increase in the global average temperature to well below 2°C above pre-industrial levels and pursuing efforts to limit it to 1.5 °C. And they went further, expressing “alarm and utmost concern that human activities have caused around 1.1 °C of warming to date, that impacts are already being felt in every region, and that carbon budgets consistent with achieving the Paris Agreement temperature goal are now small and being rapidly depleted.” They recognized that the impacts of climate change will be much lower at a temperature increase of 1.5 °C compared with 2 °C.

Accelerating action

Countries stressed the urgency of action “in this critical decade,” when carbon dioxide emissions must be reduced by 45 per cent to reach net zero around mid-century. But with present climate plans – the Nationally determined Contributions — falling far short on ambition, the Glasgow Climate Pact calls on all countries to present stronger national action plans next year, instead of in 2025, which was the original timeline. Countries also called on UNFCCC to do an annual NDC Synthesis Report to gauge the present level of ambition.

Moving away from fossil fuels

In perhaps the most contested decision in Glasgow, countries ultimately agreed to a provision calling for a phase-down of coal power and a phase-out of “inefficient” fossil fuel subsidies – two key issues that had never been explicitly mentioned in decisions of UN climate talks before, despite coal, oil and gas being the main drivers of global warming. Many countries, and NGOs, expressed dissatisfaction that the language on coal was significantly weakened (from phase-out to phase-down) and consequently, was not as ambitious as it needs to be.

Delivering on climate finance

Developed countries came to Glasgow falling short on their promise to deliver US$100 billion a year for developing countries. Voicing “regret,” the Glasgow outcome reaffirms the pledge and urges developed countries to fully deliver on the US$100 billion goal urgently. Developed countries, in a report, expressed confidence that the target would be met in 2023.

Stepping up support for adaptation

The Glasgow Pact calls for a doubling of finance to support developing countries in adapting to the impacts of climate change and building resilience. This won’t provide all the funding that poorer countries need, but it would significantly increase finance for protecting lives and livelihoods, which so far made up only about 25 per cent of all climate finance (with 75 per cent going towards green technologies to mitigate greenhouse gas emissions). Glasgow also established a work programme to define a global goal on adaptation, which will identify collective needs and solutions to the climate crisis already affecting many countries.

Completing the Paris rulebook

Countries reached agreement on the remaining issues of the so-called Paris rulebook, the operational details for the practical implementation of the Paris Agreement. Among them are the norms related to carbon markets, which will allow countries struggling to meet their emissions targets to purchase emissions reductions from other nations that have already exceeded their targets. Negotiations were also concluded on an Enhanced Transparency Framework, providing for common timeframes and agreed formats for countries to regularly report on progress, designed to build trust and confidence that all countries are contributing their share to the global effort.

Focusing on loss & damage

Acknowledging that climate change is having increasing impacts on people especially in the developing world, countries agreed to strengthen a network— known as the Santiago Network – that connects vulnerable countries with providers of technical assistance, knowledge and resources to address climate risks. They also launched a new “Glasgow dialogue” to discuss arrangements for the funding of activities to avert, minimize and address loss and damage associated with the adverse effects of climate change.

New deals and announcements

There were many other significant deals and announcements – outside of the Glasgow Climate Pact – which can have major positive impacts if they are indeed implemented. These include: 

Forests

137 countries took a landmark step forward by committing to halt and reverse forest loss and land degradation by 2030. The pledge is backed by $12bn in public and $7.2bn in private funding. In addition, CEOs from more than 30 financial institutions with over $8.7 trillion of global assets committed to eliminate investment in activities linked to deforestation.  

Methane

103 countries, including 15 major emitters, signed up to the Global Methane Pledge, which aims to limit methane emissions by 30 per cent by 2030, compared to 2020 levels. Methane, one of the most potent greenhouse gases, is responsible for a third of current warming from human activities.

Cars

Over 30 countries, six major vehicle manufacturers and other actors, like cities, set out their determination for all new car and van sales to be zero-emission vehicles by 2040 globally and 2035 in leading markets, accelerating the decarbonization of road transport, which currently accounts for about 10 per cent of global greenhouse gas emissions.

Coal

Leaders from South Africa, the United Kingdom, the United States, France, Germany, and the European Union announced a ground-breaking partnership to support South Africa – the world’s most carbon-intensive electricity producer— with $8.5 billion over the next 3-5 years to make a just transition away from coal, to a low-carbon economy.

Private finance

Private financial institutions and central banks announced moves to realign trillions of dollars towards achieving global net zero emissions. Among them is the Glasgow Financial Alliance for Net Zero, with over 450 firms across 45 countries that control $130 trillion in assets, requiring its member to set robust, science-based near-term targets.

2.    COP 27, SHARM EL-SHEIKH, EGYPT, 2022: - TOGETHER FOR IMPLEMENTATION[7]

Under the slogan Together for implementation, the 27th United Nations Climate Change Conference (COP27), was held in Sharm El-Sheikh, Egypt, from 6 to 18 November 2022 (extended by 36 hours, until the morning of 20th). The COP27 was under the Egyptian Presidency on behalf of the African region.

It brought together almost 35,000 representatives of 198 governments with the aim of accelerating climate action to fulfil the goals of the Paris Agreement. After intense negotiations, the Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan1 was adopted, as well as a number of other important decisions to further operationalise the Paris Agreement.

The COP27 was convened near the end of a year that has seen devastating floods and unprecedented heat waves, severe droughts and formidable storms, all unequivocal signs of the unfolding climate emergency. At the same time, millions of people throughout the world are confronting the impacts of simultaneous crises in energy, food, water, and cost of living, aggravated by severe geopolitical conflicts and tensions.

Whilst the COP26 in Glasgow was all about target setting but COP27 in Egypt was all about implementation. COP27 is also taking place against the backdrop of inadequate ambition to curb greenhouse gas emissions. According to the UN’s Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), CO2 emissions need to be cut 45% by 2030, compared to 2010 levels to meet the central Paris Agreement goal of limiting temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius by the end of this century. This is crucial to avoid the worst impacts of climate change, including more frequent and severe droughts, heat waves and rainfall. A report published by UNFCCC ahead of COP27 shows that whilst countries are bending the curve of global greenhouse gas emissions downward, efforts remain insufficient to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 degrees Celsius by the end of the century[8].

Back in 2009 richer nations promised developing countries they would provide USD100 bln a year by 2020 to help with climate change, that goal was missed and expected to be achieved in 2023.

Ahead of the conference, 200 countries were asked to submit new plans to cut emissions by 2030, to prevent temperatures rising by more than 1.5 °C. With these new plans, global temperatures are still expected to rise to 2.4 °C. Thus, the Egyptian COP27 President, Sameh Shoukry, wanted to focus on turning some of the more ambitious targets and pledges into tangible action. However, since COP26 in Glasgow until COP27, only 29 countries came forward with updated more ambitious Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs).

The Sharm El-Sheikh Climate Change Conference opened with strong appeals to step up climate action and support and move from pledges to implementation.

The Summit adopted the Sharm el-Sheikh climate implementation summit Declaration COP27. The declaration acknowledges the scientific reports on current and future impacts of climate change and recognized the seriousness of the climate emergency facing the planet. While recognizing every country’s responsibility to act and rise to the occasion to deliver on previous commitments from the Convention to the Paris Agreement, leaders reiterated that it was time to move from pledges to rapid, robust, and impactful implementation[9].

BRIEF ANALYSIS OF KEY COP27 OUTCOMES

Global Stocktake of Paris Agreement

A new UN Climate Change report[10] shows that while countries are bending the curve of global greenhouse gas emissions downward, these efforts remain insufficient to limit global temperature rise to 1.5 °C by the end of the century. The combined climate pledges of 193 Parties under the Paris Agreement could put the world on track for around 2.5 °C of warming by the end of the century. The report’s findings underscore the need for urgent implementation and much more ambitious climate action.

The global stocktake of the Paris Agreement (GST) is a process for taking stock of the implementation of the Paris Agreement aimed to assess the world’s collective progress towards achieving its long-term goals. The GST facilitates the assessment of global collective progress on mitigation, adaptation and means of implementation. The first GST runs from 2021 to 2023 and will be repeated every 5 years. Its outcomes will inform countries on updating and enhancing their NDCs, their climate actions and support. This process is critical for accelerating climate action. There are three components to the global stocktake process:

1) Information collection and preparation; 2) Technical assessment; and 3) Consideration of outputs. The last phase of the GST, consideration of outputs, will take place at COP28 in 2023. At these sessions this item related to the ongoing technical phase of the first GST and its political outcome, expected at COP 28.

Global Goal on Adaptation

COP 26 established a comprehensive two-year (2022-2023) Glasgow-Sharm El-Sheikh work programme (GlaSS) on the Global Goal on Adaptation (GGA). This item focused on the GGA work programme, specifically to capture progress made throughout 2022 and provide guidance and concrete ways forward for 2023.

Setup of Loss and Damage Fund

A most significant achievement at COP27 is considered the setup of a “loss and damage” fund (LDF) to help vulnerable countries pay their rising costs of climate damage from wilder weather and rising seas. Climate “loss and damage” includes not just harm to people, their homes and infrastructure from disasters such as floods, droughts and storms but also forced displacement from slower impacts such as sea level rise, as well as losses of cultural heritage and community livelihoods.

The agreed loss and damage deal at COP27 is a positive step, but there was a lot of criticism about countries not moving faster to decrease greenhouse gas emissions and limiting warming to below 1.5 °C. The leaders had missed the chance to speed up the rapid and deep emissions cuts essential to limit climate damage. However, given the nature of the negotiations, it had not been possible to take decisive steps forward to reduce emissions and move away from polluting oil and gas.

Safeguarding Food Security and Ending Hunger

The COP27 cover decision also says that “safeguarding food security and ending hunger” is a fundamental priority, and that communities can better protect themselves from climate effects if water systems are protected and conserved. The text also mentioned food for the first time and recognised how food shortages could continue to be driven by climate change. This is progress as the Glasgow Climate Pact (2021) made no mention of agriculture, food or water. However, the decision doesn’t have new dedicated funding for food systems from governments. Absent from the text is any reference to the IPCC’s estimate that food systems are responsible for between 21% and 37% of global emissions. New research[11] estimated that 42% of recent food price inflation has been due to climate change. In its report the Word Bank warns of ‘human catastrophe’ food crisis[12]. In Egypt countries committed to a four-year programme to discuss solutions to ongoing food issues.

The overarching cover decisions Sharm El-Sheikh Implementation Plan[13] capture the progress made in the negotiations and various events held in conjunction with the negotiations, such as the Marrakesh Partnership for Global Climate Action. They address science, ambition and implementation, energy, mitigation, adaptation, loss and damage, early warning systems, just transition, finance, technology, capacity building, transparency, taking stock, Article 6, Ocean, Forest, and action by non-Party Stakeholders.

Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture

The Koronivia Joint Work on Agriculture (KJWA) addresses issues related to agriculture, including through workshops and expert meetings, with consideration of vulnerabilities of agriculture to climate change, as well as approaches to addressing food security. Under this item negotiations focused on considering the next phase of KJWA, including an enhanced joint work programme. The COP27 Decision urges parties and others to increase their efforts to promote sustainable agriculture, with a view to eradicating hunger and poverty while ensuring food security.

Boosting Low Emission Energy

Matters Relating to the Work Programme for Urgently Scaling up Mitigation Ambition and Implementation (Mitigation Work Programme – MWP) were mandated by the Glasgow Climate Pact and aims to explore ways to raise mitigation ambition before 2030. During the negotiations the main disagreements were about identifying new categories of countries, such as “major emitters” or “vulnerable developing countries”, and timeframe of the Mitigation Work Programme (MWP), especially the end date (to conclude in 2023 or 2030) and actions. On temperature goals, there were calls to refer to the need to stay below 1.5 °C, while other countries wanted to refer to the full text of the temperature goals in the Paris Agreement to stay well below 2 °C while pursuing efforts to limit long-term temperature rise to 1.5 °C. The final decision emphasized the urgent need for increasing efforts to reduce collectively emissions through accelerated action and implementation of domestic mitigation measures to achieve the Paris Agreement goal, and Parties were requested to revisit and strengthen the 2030 targets in their NDCs, aligning them with their long-term low greenhouse gas emission development strategies.

 The Sharm el-Sheikh implementation plan includes references to boosting “low- emission” energy, as well as renewables. The text also supports the plans of many fossil- fuel-producing countries to use fledging carbon capture technology to curb emissions rather than scaling back production. Also, for the first time the final text encourages reform of big lenders such as the IFIs and multilateral development banks (MDBs). For example, the IMF has USD1 trillion available to lend to countries in financial distress, but only a small fraction of this is climate finance. The COP’s endorsement of reform is significant because it comes from countries who are also shareholders in these institutions and can make change happen.

Phase Down Coal Use

Developed countries had pressed, for an agreement to reach peak global emissions before 2025, to decide a clear path to phase down coal use (a goal set in Glasgow), and to phase down all fossil fuels, not just coal. All of those things were not included in the final cover decision – the Sharm el-Sheikh implementation plan but included that limiting global warming to 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels requires “rapid, deep and sustained reductions in greenhouse gas emissions” by 2030. The section on energy had also been weakened at the last minute – calls to phase out fossil fuels were blocked by oil-producing states. It is recognized that the only way to safely limit warming to 1.5 °C is to equitably phase out oil, gas, and coal, instead, this decision creates a risk of a major increase of new oil and gas production.

Long-Term Climate Finance

This process aims to advance mobilization of climate finance resources from multiple sources, including public, private, bilateral, multilateral, and others. In 2010 COP16 in Cancun, developed countries committed to a goal of USD100 billion annually by 2020 for developing countries. A key issue at this COP was how to reflect on the fact that this goal had not been met and how to address the gap and encourage actions to support developing countries’ needs. The lack of a common definition and accounting methodology with respect to assessing progress towards the goal was recognized.

New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance

The Paris Agreement states that a new collective quantified goal on climate finance (NCQG) shall be set prior to the 2025 CMA, from a floor of USD 100 billion per year. Subsequently, in Glasgow Parties decided that their work will be organized in an ad hoc work programme (including technical expert dialogues (TED)), submissions, ministerial dialogues, and stocktakes and guidance. The work will continue consideration of this matter at the next conference. At the negotiations there were discussion on the level of the new goal, with developing countries seeking to reference the need for trillions rather than billions of dollars, while developed countries considers that it was premature to consider a “quantum”, or numerical financial goal. Also, there were significant debates on the sources of support. Disagreements were also around the role for the private sector and an expanded group of donor countries.

Action for Climate Empowerment

Action for Climate Empowerment (ACE) is a term adopted by the UNFCCC to denote work under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 12 of the PA (education, training, public awareness, public participation, public access to information, international cooperation). The overarching goal of ACE is to empower all members of society to engage in climate action. The COP26 and the CMA3 adopted the 10-year Glasgow work programme on ACE. COP27 adopted the four-year action plan under the Glasgow work programme on ACE, which focus on immediate action through short-term, clear and time-bound activities, guided by the priority areas of the Glasgow work programme (policy coherence; coordinated action; tools and support; and monitoring, evaluation and reporting).

Gender and Climate Change

An intermediate review of the gender action plan’s implementation was considered. Language on support for gender-related activities appears in the overarching COP27 cover decision and the decision on guidance to the GEF. Parties are urged to accelerate their efforts to advance implementation of the enhanced Lima Work Programme on Gender and its gender action plan (GAP):

·   encourages parties and relevant organizations to strengthen the use of sex-disaggregated data and gender analysis in implementing climate policies, plans, strategies and action;

·   invites the ILO to consider organizing a workshop or dialogue;

·   underscores the need to promote efforts towards gender balance and improve inclusivity in the UNFCCC process by inviting future COP Presidencies to nominate women as high-level climate champions, parties to promote greater gender balance in national delegations, and event organizers to promote gender-balanced events;

·   encourages parties and relevant public and private entities to strengthen the gender responsiveness of climate finance.

 

ARTICLE 6 OF PARIS AGREEMENT

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement was one of the most technical parts of the COP27 process. It is about cooperative approaches to cutting emissions, market and non-market based. While the Article 6 “rulebook” was completed at COP26 in Glasgow, COP27 faced decisions on the definitions and procedures that are still needed before any trading can begin. Several contentious issues were deferred, including how to treat emissions from “removals”, whether to allow credits for “emissions avoidance” and when carbon credits could be “revoked”. COP27 managed to deliver a significant amount of additional guidance that will help to operationalize Article 6. However, trading under Article 6 is unlikely to start before 2024 at the earliest, while the voluntary carbon markets may take off earlier. However, countries that are planning to take part in the Paris Agreement market mechanisms should already build the required national structures.

One generic issue of all the climate change treaties is the fact that currently countries calculate their total emissions and set targets based on what they produce within their borders such as from producing electricity or burning fuels. This means that they don’t count the emissions from the goods and services produced by another country for them. This is even though the developed nations import large amounts of manufactured products from developing countries. For example, if these “consumption-based” emissions were counted then the UK’s carbon footprint would more than double. In the cover decision for the first-time countries recognised “the importance of transition[ing] to sustainable patterns of consumption”. However, it is not clear yet how governments will translate this into national actions.

Recommendations for Participation in Article 6.2 and Article 6.4 of the Paris Agreement

The benefits from participating in the carbon markets for the host countries are proven, as they stimulate sustainable development co-benefits. As many developing countries do not have the resources necessary to make economy-wide transition towards a low emissions future, through the participation in the mechanisms they can receive certain financial resources, clean technologies, and new green jobs. However, there is needs for a lot of efforts from the host country governments to prepare, operationalize, run, monitor, and report the process of participation in the mechanisms. These efforts could be supported by international organisations, but the host country government needs to be proactive. There is a need for a clear national position on how and how much will be transferred and a mechanism for timely adjustments depending on the NDC implementation status.

A national Article 6 strategy and a policy framework will help the country to participate efficiently in and benefit from the Paris Agreement market-based mechanisms, while forming an integral component of the country’s Long Term Low Emissions Development Strategy and Sustainable Development.

Article 6 of the Paris Agreement establishes two market-based approaches for Parties to cooperate voluntarily in achieving their NDCs under the Paris Agreement:

·   Article 6.2 sets out guidelines covering the internationally transferred mitigation outcomes (ITMOs) between two governments that are Parties to the Paris Agreement.

·   Article 6.4 establishes a new project-based multilateral mechanism (Sustainable Development Mechanism – SDM) “to contribute to the mitigation of greenhouse gas emissions and support sustainable development”. This Mechanism replaces the former Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and will be governed by a Supervisory Board that would approve all Article 6.4 projects.

ITMOs are the emission reductions under Article 6.2 that can already be traded between countries. Countries such as Japan and Switzerland already have concrete plans to buy a variety of credits and count them towards their NDCs. However, it is typically a lengthy process for countries to conclude Article 6.2 bilateral agreements/Memoranda of Understanding (MoU), so it may still be some time until ITMOs are widely traded. As for the emission reductions created under Article 6.4 (A6.4ERs), it will likely take two to three years more or longer before they can be issued and traded. The Article 6.4 system is overseen by the UNFCCC Supervisory Body.

Because of the stronger bottom-up architecture of the Paris Agreement market-based mechanisms compared to the flexible mechanisms of the Kyoto Protocol, they require higher levels of engagement and oversight from the host country institutions. Thus, more efforts are needed in capacity building and preparations, including fulfilling certain eligibility criteria.

There is a need to establish a national institutional framework to effectively govern, track and report on Article 6 activities and transactions. As a first step, the government should appoint a national focal point for Article 6. A requirement for Article 6.4 is the establishment of a Designated National Authority (DNA). A DNA is a national organization granted responsibility by the government to authorise and approve participation in SDM projects. The main task of the DNA is to assess potential SDM projects, to determine whether they will assist the host country in achieving its sustainable development goals, and to provide a letter of no objections to project participants in SDM projects.

Countries like Nigeria needs to have a very good expertise and sound understand of adopted decisions on implementation of the mechanisms. Additionally, there is a need to build expertise of the government and other relevant stakeholders (including private sector) through trainings, workshops, etc. provided by UNFCCC or other international organisations, and establish dedicated units to deal with emissions trading.

 

3.    COP 28, DUBAI, UAE, 2023: - JUST, ORDERLY AND EQUITABLE ENERGY TRANSITION[14]

The COP 28 UN Climate Change Conference in Dubai, was the biggest of its kind. About 100,000 delegates were registered, including more than 150 Heads of State and Government, about 2,000 official representatives of fossil fuel companies, were among the representatives of national delegations, civil society, the private sector, indigenous people, youth, philanthropy and international organizations in attendance at the conference from 30 November to 13 December 2023.

COP 28 was particularly momentous, having shown that progress was too slow across all areas of climate actions: - From reducing greenhouse gas emissions, to strengthening resilience to a changing climate, to getting the financial and technological support to vulnerable nations, countries responded with a decision on how to accelerate action across all areas by 2030. This includes a call on governments to speed up the transition away from fossil fuels to renewables such as wind and solar power in their next round of climate commitments.

The Key Outcomes[15]

1). The end of fossil fuels?[16]

Perhaps surprisingly, this was the first COP to officially acknowledge that fossil fuels are the root cause of climate change. And it is worth remembering that fossil fuels were only first mentioned in an international climate agreement in 2021 at COP26 in Glasgow. Yet it still lacked ambition.

Most countries wanted a strong statement on phasing out or at the very least phase down (reducing) fossil fuels. Instead countries agreed a statement saying we must “transition away from fossil fuels in energy systems, in a just, orderly and equitable manner, accelerating action in this critical decade, so as to achieve net zero by 2050 in keeping with the science”.

This language – a “transition away” rather than a full “phase-out” – is not as strong as many wanted. As a statement made by Samoa on behalf of the Alliance of Small Island States put it, these decisions are “an incremental advancement over business as usual” when what is needed is “exponential step-change” to keep 1.5°C alive.

In theory the agreement heralds the end of the fossil fuel era, but it offers an intentional loophole for countries and companies to “abate” the use of fossil fuels by using carbon capture and storage. This justifies the continued burning of oil and gas[17].

2). Loss and damage[18]

“Loss and damage” is the term given for finance for developing countries that have suffered a major climate change-related disaster. A fund was agreed at COP27 in 2022 and recent announcements mean US$700 million has now been pledged.

While this is welcome news it is a drop in the ocean compared with the US$400 billion actually needed. It’s also insignificant compared to, for instance, the estimated US$7 billion cost of building the COP28 venue Dubai Expo City.

It is still not clear how the fund will work, what the major funding streams will be or whether the allocation of finance will be community-driven and corruption free. And despite opposition, it has been agreed the World Bank will administer the fund for a negotiated fee of 24% – meaning one in four dollars pledged will never make it to the countries in need.

So overall, this summit did not deliver on climate finance and this key issue has been pushed to COP29 November 2024.

3). Renewable energy and transitional fuels[19]

A pledge signed by 118 countries to triple renewable energy capacity and double the global rate of energy efficiency by 2030 is a step in the right direction.

It is worth noting the text of the pledge also recognises the role “transitional fuels” will have in maintaining energy security for the time being. This makes the use of climate-damaging liquefied petroleum gas acceptable. This isn’t ideal, but in developing countries it is still a healthier and less polluting option for home cooking and heating than burning wood or other biomass. Nonetheless, there really should be a timeline attached to the use of these transitional fuels.

On the sidelines of COP28, green hydrogen also had its moment. Produced through a process that splits water using electricity generated from wind or solar power, industries pledged to scale up zero-emissions fuel derived from renewables-based hydrogen to 11 million tonnes by 2030.

4). Oil and gas decarbonisation charter[20]

Over 50 national and international oil companies, representing about 40% of global production, signed a decarbonisation charter. The initiative sets three main aims: to achieve net zero emissions in each company’s direct operations (as opposed to the use of their products) by or before 2050, to achieve near-zero methane leakage from the production of oil and gas by 2030, and to achieve zero routine flaring (burning excess gas) by 2030.

The last two pledges are particularly important as methane is a very powerful (but short-lived) greenhouse gas and a quarter of all man-made methane emissions come from oil and gas production. So reducing these emissions is a quick win which buys us time. But again, 60% of world oil and gas production is not covered by this charter. These companies will continue to save money by venting methane and flaring natural gas.

5). Global stocktake – 1.5°C is at risk[21]

The “global stocktake”, finalised at COP28, was the first time the global climate regime took stock of how the international community has collectively reduced its greenhouse gas emissions since the Paris Agreement in 2015.

The biggest takeaway from the stocktake told us what we already knew – the world is way behind and the 1.5°C warming limit agreed in Paris is at risk.

While the big takeaway from COP28 will be that countries have come up with a deal that calls for them to transition away from fossil fuels while acknowledging the need for a “deep, rapid” reduction in emissions, the weak language is at complete odds with the official global stocktake.

 

4.    COP 29, BAKU, AZERBAIJAN, 2024: - CLIMATE FINANCE[22]

The 29th Conference of Parties (COP 29) to the UNFCC took place in BAKU, Azerbaijan, between 11 and 24 November, 2024.

THE MAIN OUTCOMES OF COP29

COP29 was described as a “finance COP”, meaning the focus of the 2024 negotiations was on developing and agreeing the processes by which climate action will be paid for. This was reflected in COP29’s two main outcomes[23]:

·         An agreement on the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG); and

·         The operationalising of the international carbon trading system overseen by the UN under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement.

1. Agreement on Climate Finance[24]

COP29 saw the culmination of three years of negotiations on the NCQG. The final agreed NCQG Decision will now form the foundation for international climate finance arrangements after 2025. This Decision contains an agreement by the Parties to the Paris Agreement to triple the annual target for climate finance from the current USD 100bn to USD 300bn by 2035. Developed country parties will take the lead in mobilising this sum for developing country parties.

The Decision also contains a reference to a further annual climate finance target of USD 1.3tn of financing to be provided to developing countries by 2035. However, unlike the USD 300bn target, there is no formal obligation on countries to meet this larger target (which is to be raised from a variety of sources including private finance).

Many developing country parties have rejected in principle taking on more debt to pay for their greenhouse gas (GHG) emission reduction and climate change adaptation measures. However, the 2035 targets may be met both via the provision of grants and concession-based finance and via higher interest loans and other commercial financial instruments from both public and private sources. Further, and for the first time, voluntary financial contributions made by developing country parties will also be formally counted as contributing to reaching UNFCCC climate finance targets. This has opened up the possibility for countries categorised as “developing”, such as China, to take on more formal leadership roles in the UN climate arena.

2. Operationalising Carbon Markets[25]

After 9 years of negotiations, parties at COP 29 agreed on the rules and methodologies for the international carbon trading system envisioned by Article 6 of the Paris Agreement. Article 6 sets out a system in which countries can trade emission reduction credits (known as ITMOs) between themselves so that an emission reduction in one country can be counted against the emissions generated in another country. This trading system is designed to incentivise states to invest in emission reduction projects as well as meet and surpass their own emission reduction targets, thereby lowering overall global emission levels and fostering sustainable development.

Two Decisions were issued on the new international carbon market established under Article 6.4 (one at the beginning of COP29 and the other at the end). A further Decision was also issued at the end of COP on the rules for inter-state carbon trading under Article 6.2.

These three Decisions have set out the final steps required for the markets and trading system to be operationalised, allowing for emission reductions assessed and authorised under Article 6 to be officially counted as contributing to countries’ emission reduction plans. Article 6 carbon markets are seen as a key tool for generating financial flows from polluting to less polluting countries through Article 6.2 and a means for States with natural carbon sinks such as rainforests and mangroves to financially benefit from their preservation.

COP29’S SUCCESSES AND FAILURES[26]

This COP29 Briefing Paper set out four areas in which a successful COP would see significant progress:

1.    The NCQG;

2.    New and ambitious NDCs;

3.    Agreement on Article 6; and

4.    Loss and damage.

While a climate COP’s success or failure can be assessed differently depending on each state’s negotiating goals and outlook[27], this section sets out what progress was made on each of those four areas as well as highlighting one further area of interest.

1. The New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG)

The agreement on the NCQG is generally considered a heavily qualified success. The USD 1.3tn climate finance goal that was demanded by many developing country parties is contained in the final agreed Decision. However, this Decision only “calls on” parties to meet this goal and therefore the does not place any obligation on states to meet the goal by the 2035 deadline.

While the new USD 300bn goal for annual climate finance to developing countries triples the previous target of USD 100bn, the wording of the decision text only requires for this funding to be “mobilised” rather than “provided” (i.e. only made available rather than actively distributed) by 2035. Controversially, the funds made available can be made up of a wide variety of public, private, bilateral and multilateral sources of finance as well as undefined “alternative sources”. It remains unclear where the required increase in climate financing between 2025 and 2035 will come from and whether developed country states will commit greater levels of grant and concession-based funding than they have already.

While coming under criticism from many sides, and despite last minute walk outs by significant negotiating blocs, the NCQG Decision was agreed at the end of COP29. While the NCQG Decision does not mobilise as much money as many developing country parties were advocating for prior to COP29, the NCQG is a compromise between the need for greater financial support for developing nations, without which they will be unable to reduce their GHG emissions and adapt to the negative effects of climate change, and the reduced ability of developed countries to provide that support out of public funds.

Formally opening up climate finance targets to contributions from both the private sector and developing countries was seen by many developed country parties as a necessary step. This broadening of the contributor base will also allow developing country parties, such as China, who already provide financing for energy transition projects across the developing world, to gain recognition for the efforts they are making towards meeting the world’s climate goals. If successful, the NCQG’s attempt to foster a greater role for the private sector in adaptation and the energy transition could be beneficial for both developed and developing countries. The NCQG decision also has a scheduled review in 2030, and so may be renegotiated sooner than the 2035 target deadline.

2. New and Ambitious NDCs

Prior to COP29, we suggested that a successful COP would see a number of new and more ambitious nationally determined contributions (NDCs – essentially countries’ emission reduction and climate change adaptation plans) announced during the conference. While the deadline for countries to announce their next round of NDCs is not until the end of February 2025, early and ambitious announcements would have put pressure on other countries to not only meet the February deadline but also increase their own ambition so as not to be left behind. In the end, only Brazil, the UAE and the UK announced new NDCs at COP29.

The absence of significant numbers of new NDCs added to the failure to progress negotiations on the outcomes of the first global stocktake (GST). The first GST, which culminated in the UAE in COP28 last year, was a process that facilitated a review of the implementation of parties’ existing NDCs so that parties could raise their ambition and improve the implementation of their next round of NDCs. However, progress on this issue stalled as countries from the Like-Minded Group of Developing Countries (LMDC) negotiating bloc, especially Saudi Arabia, objected to any agreement that would give the UNFCCC oversight over how NDCs are prepared or implemented. Failure to progress the GST negotiations, compounded by a less ambitious NCQG than many expected, may now mean that it will be impossible for developing and climate vulnerable states to prepare and implement ambitious NDCs, placing the 1.5°C warming goal essentially out of reach.

3. Agreement on Article 6

Agreement on Article 6 has been hailed as one of COP29’s real successes. After 9 years of negotiations, parties finally agreed on the framework rules and methodologies of a worldwide carbon market and trading system. Parties have designed the new Article 6 system so that it will allow countries to create and authorise reliable emission reduction credits that countries can use to either offset their own national emissions or trade with other countries. The three decisions that made up COP29’s agreement on Article 6 allow states to start developing their national carbon markets and facilitating inter-state trades. Although past carbon trading schemes have not been as successful as initially hoped for, parties are clear that the Article 6 carbon market should be an effective tool for persuading countries to reduce GHG emissions whilst financially rewarding developing countries for developing sustainably and protecting nature. Look out for Clyde & Co’s upcoming guide to the Article 6 carbon markets, which will explain Article 6’s implications for states and corporate entities.

4. Loss and Damage

Following the establishment at COP19 of the Warsaw International Mechanism for Loss and Damage associated with Climate Change Impacts (WIM), COP27 in Sharm el-Sheikh and COP28 in the UAE saw significant progress on integrating loss and damage into the architecture of the UNFCCC process. Loss and damage can be understood as the cost of the damage that will be inevitably incurred by countries due to the negative effects of climate change. However, while some procedural outcomes were reached at COP29, no substantive progress was made in loss and damage negotiations. References to loss and damage in the NCQG simply acknowledge existing failures to provide adequate funding to address the issue. No new funds have therefore been mobilised to address loss and damage specifically. Given the importance of this issue to many developing country parties, especially those that most vulnerable to climate change, it is expected that loss and damage will be an area of contention at future COPs.

5. Negotiation Deadlock

While agreement was eventually reached on the key outcomes of the NCQG and Article 6, one under-addressed failure of COP29 was that negotiations on many other issues broke down completely without any agreement or resolution. Parties could not reach agreement on issues including the outcomes of the first GST, just transition, adaptation and other finance and technology negotiations. The result of this failure being that these negotiations were postponed for either 6 months or a year. While these failures were not critical to the UNFCCC process in Baku, the incurred delay in what has been recognised as a “critical decade” for climate action, reflects the general struggles at COP29 for parties with opposing views to achieve compromise.

LOOKING AHEAD TO COP30

While COP29 has now concluded, there are several issues that will continue to develop between the end of COP29 and the beginning of COP30 in Belém, Brazil, in November 2025. Here we set out some key issues to watch out for in the year ahead[28]: -

1. NDCs

All parties to the Paris Agreement must submit their new NDCs before the end of February 2025, to allow time for the content of those NDCs to be reviewed and analysed before COP30 in November 2025. While most states still claim that they will meet this deadline, informally many admit that it is likely that they will fail to publish their NDCs before the 61st meeting of the Subsidiary Bodies of the UNFCCC in the summer of 2025 or indeed before COP30 itself. The greater the number of states that meet the agreed deadline, the better understanding the world will have of whether countries are on track to meet their goals under the Paris Agreement. The impact of a failure to meet the publication deadline will be compounded by parties’ failure to agree on how to implement the outcomes of the first GST and the corresponding absence of guidance on the content and form of countries’ NDCs. This means that the content and form of each party’s new NDC is entirely at each State’s discretion and until each NDC is published there is little ability to predict its contents.

2. Climate Finance

When the Least Developed Countries (LDC) and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) negotiating blocs walked out of negotiations on the final day of COP29, one of their conditions for returning to talks was for a commitment by developed country parties to provide greater clarity on how the USD 1.3tn annual climate finance goal would be achieved (for more information on these and other negotiating blocs see Clyde & Co’s COP29 Briefing Paper). The NCQG Decision consequently refers to a “Baku to Belém Roadmap to 1.3T”. This “roadmap” aims to scale up climate finance flows to developing countries to facilitate GHG emission reduction and adaptation measures with a focus on non-debt based financial instruments. Given the lack of specificity in the NCQG decision, it is currently unclear what exactly will come out of the Baku to Belém Roadmap. However, its importance to many developing country parties means that if their concerns are not addressed in this process then COP30 in Belém may see further hard-fought finance negotiations around the USD 1.3tn goal.

3. Article 6

A new UN carbon market under Article 6 of the Paris Agreement may have been operationalised at COP29, but it will be the first year of the market’s operation which will see the first examples of the market in action and what teething problems it may encounter. Uncertainty remains over the impact of Article 6 on the voluntary carbon markets and on existing emission trading schemes, and so the next year to COP30 will see crucial first impressions made around the quality of Article 6 credits and the effectiveness of the rules and methodologies that have been agreed.

4. An International Court of Justice Advisory Opinion

Although independent of the UNFCCC process, in early 2025 the International Court of Justice (ICJ) will publish an Advisory Opinion on climate change. As part of this process, over 100 nations and organisations will make submissions to the ICJ from 2 to 13 December 2024. The ICJ’s subsequent Advisory Opinion will provide guidance on two main issues. The first will be on the nature of states’ obligations under international law to prevent climate change and damage to the environment. The second will be on the legal consequences that states should incur if, through their acts or omissions, they have made significant contributions to climate change and past environmental damage. Although the ICJ’s Advisory Opinion will not be binding, it will carry significant persuasive and moral weight and will shape the nature and direction of climate litigation against states and corporate entities for the foreseeable future.

5. Multilateral Development Bank Reform   

The NCQG Decision adopted at COP29 emphasises the role that multilateral sources of finance, and especially multilateral development banks (MDBs), will play in meeting the new USD 300bn climate finance goal. The Decision highlights that the world’s current multilateral financial architecture will need to be reformed so that MDBs can focus on and facilitate investment into urgently addressing climate change. Some of the reform envisaged by the NCQG Decision includes shifting risk appetites for climate finance. This reform will require the nation-state shareholders of MDBs to instigate and lead reforms of the MDBs’ operational models, channels and instruments. The IMF and World Bank’s annual meeting in October 2025, just prior to COP30, will therefore be a crucial forum where we may see concrete proposals being made as to how MDBs should and will aim to respond to the invitation made by the parties to the UNFCCC for MDBs to take a greater role in climate financing. 

6. The Organisation of COP30

Given COP30 will be the first official opportunity for countries in the UNFCCC process to consider and take stock of the new round of NDCs, expect the host country, Brazil, to begin calling on parties to announce new and ambitious NDCs sooner rather than later. Brazil will also likely focus on the symbolism of holding a COP in the city of Belém in the heart of the Amazon rainforest, although some have raised concerns about the impact on the Amazon of holding the event there. This year, both France and Argentina withdrew their negotiators from COP29 for different diplomatic reasons and the COP process itself came under criticism from experienced negotiators. It is likely that Brazil will therefore attempt to engage more diplomatically with parties and perhaps try to shrink the numbers of people granted permission to attend. The lead up to COP30 will also likely see the resolution of the uncertainty around the US’s position on the Paris Agreement and involvement with the UNFCCC process given incoming President Donald Trump’s stated commitment to once again withdraw the US from the Paris Agreement.

Nigeria’s Path Forward Post-Baku Climate Change Conference: Opportunities and Next Steps

The Baku Climate Change Conference (COP29) occurred in Baku, Azerbaijan, from November 11 to November 22, 2024. This annual event brought together representatives from nearly 200 countries to discuss and negotiate actions to address the global climate crisis and set new goals for climate finance, adaptation, and mitigation.

One of the key outcomes was the agreement to triple climate finance to developing countries, increasing the annual goal from USD 100 billion to USD 300 billion by 2035. This new goal, known as the New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG), aims to help countries protect their people and economies against climate disasters and share in the benefits of the clean energy boom.

Additionally, COP29 saw progress on carbon markets, transparent climate reporting, and adaptation measures. The conference also emphasized the importance of integrating health and climate action with a new coalition to prioritize climate and health initiatives.

While the conference achieved significant milestones, it also highlighted the need for continued efforts and more ambitious actions to address the climate crisis. The outcomes of COP29 set the stage for future climate negotiations and actions, focusing on achieving the Paris Agreement's goals, which include limiting global warming to well below 2 degrees Celsius and enhancing global climate resilience. This involves not only reducing greenhouse gas emissions but also adapting to the impacts of climate change.

Emphasizing the need for strategic planning and implementation to maximize the benefits, the outcomes of the Baku Climate Change Conference carry significant implications for Nigeria as outlined in the Table below:

 

Outcome

Description

Implications for Nigeria

New Collective Quantified Goal on Climate Finance (NCQG)

·         The agreement to triple climate finance to developing countries by 2035.

·         Increased funding for climate adaptation and mitigation projects, supporting initiatives like renewable energy projects, climate-resilient agriculture,   and   infrastructure

improvements.

Global      Goal     on Adaptation

·         A stronger focus on adaptation to build resilience against climate impacts.

·         More support for building resilience against climate impacts, such as extreme weather events and rising sea levels.

Sharm       el-Sheikh Mitigation

Ambition             and Implementation Work Programme

·         A programme aimed at enhancing            countries' climate action plans.

·         Urgent need for Nigeria to update and strengthen its Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) to align with global goals.

Provision                of

Financial             and Technical Support

·         Increased financial and technical support for developing countries.

·         Improved     climate     reporting      and capacity-building efforts.

Adaptation Fund and Loss and Damage Fund

·         Funds to address climate- related loss and damage and implement adaptation

measures.

·         Access to funds for addressing climate- related loss and damage and implementing adaptation measures.

Technology Transfer              and Capacity Building

·         Focus on technology transfer and capacity building to tackle climate change.

·         Access to new technologies and expertise to tackle climate change.

The Baku Climate Change Conference outcomes present opportunities and challenges for Nigeria. While the country can benefit from increased funding and support, it also faces the challenge of effectively utilizing these resources and aligning its policies with global goals. Nigeria must actively engage in these initiatives and leverage the available support to enhance its climate action efforts, while also navigating potential hurdles in implementation[29].


 

REFERENCES


[8]https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma4_auv_2_cover_decision.pdf

[9] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/COP27%20SUMMIT%20OUTCOMES.pdf

[10]https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cma2022_04.pdf

[11] From the universities of Bournemouth, Exeter and Sheffield, published in October 2022

[13] https://unfccc.int/sites/default/files/resource/cop27_auv_2_cover%20decision.pdf

[15] But COP28 started well with USD 400 million being announced on day one for more vulnerable countries to cope with climate disasters, and talk was all about a new climate agreement including the phasing out of all fossil fuels.

[16] Ibid.

[17] Ladan, M. T. (2024): - The Right to a clean, safe and healthy environment, climate protection, litigation and Justice: - with particular reference to Nigeria. A paper presented at a 3 day national summit on climate change in Nigeria. organised by the Citizens Wellbeing International, UK, 25 -29 August, 2024, Transcorp Hilton Hotel, Abuja.

[18] Refers to the damage or harms inflicted by climate change that go beyond what people can adapt to. These harms include: - lives lost; monetary costs from the destruction of infrastructure, buildings, crops, and other property; the loss of entire places or ways of life.

[19] Ladan, M. T. (2024), op. cit.

[21] Ibid.

[22] This annual event at Baku, agreed on a new climate finance goal to triple annual funding to USD 300 billion by 2035.

[24] COP29: - Investing in a livable planet for all. http://un.org-climate-change

[25] Baku COP29 agreed to reduce Greenhouse gas emission, and achieve net-zero emissions by 2050.

[26] Environmental groups and vulnerable nations criticized the USD 300 billion climate finance deal as a “failure”. Some countries, including India and Nigeria, accused the COP29 presidency of forcing the deal through without their consent. www.carbonbrief.org-cop29 key outcomes; www.cfr.org  was-cop29-a-failure?

[27] The UN Secretary General, Antonio outcomes, but that the agreement was a base on which to build. https://www.un.org-climatechange.

[28] Ibid

[29] Ladan, M. T. (2024), op. cit.


NILDS AfCFTA Policy Programme records key milestones

  The Division of AfCFTA Law and Policy Programme (DALP), Office of the Director-General, National Institute for Legislative and Democratic ...